VIDEO: Fr. Stephen Brock, “Aquinas and the Life of the Mind”

Philosopher Stephen Brock gave the talk “Aquinas and the Life of the Mind” on Friday, May 12, 2017 at the University of Chicago.

Saint Thomas Aquinas regards mind, or intellect, as a form of life. It is even the most perfect form, he says, because it carries the power of free choice. Yet we may wonder how free he thinks we really are. For he insists that our mind’s life depends, intimately, on a cause outside itself. But on his view, freedom of choice would not even make sense without this cause; and our lives are fullest, and freest, when we focus more on it than on ourselves. This is to follow the mind’s deepest urge, which is toward that rather neglected virtue called wisdom.

Stephen Brock (Pontifical University of Santa Croce) is Professor of Medieval Philosophy, Pontifical University of the Holy Cross, Rome. He earned a B.A. in Philosophy at the University of Chicago and a Ph.D. in Medieval Studies at the University of Toronto. Brock writes widely on Thomas Aquinas and action theory, ethics, and metaphysics. He is the author of The Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas. A Sketch (Wipf & Stock, 2015) and Action & Conduct: Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action (T&T Clark, 1998). Fr. Brock is the 2017 Visiting Scholar with Virtue, Happiness, & the Meaning of Life.

Group Photo and Last Day of the Summer Seminar “Virtue, Happiness, and Self-Transcendence”

“I feel very fortunate to have listened to and engaged with such gifted people from so many places…”

“I’m having a great fascinating time and I’ve heard attendees from all perspectives/traditions express how appreciative they are of getting this opportunity to have a respectful interdisciplinary discussion on these topics.”

We feel the same, and grateful for the comments already coming our way from our fabulous participants.

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From left: Madison Gilbertson, Carissa Phillips-Garrett, Sarah Ann Bixler, Cabrini Pak, Dan McAdams, Andrea Yetzer, Candace Vogler, Jennifer Rothschild, Ellen Dulaney, Anselm Mueller, Samantha Mendez, David McPherson, Joseph Stenberg, Fr. Steve Brock, Andrew Flynn, Jennifer A. Frey, James Dominic Rooney, Jane Klinger, Molly Ogunyemi, Tim Reilly, Craig Iffland, Marta Faria, Elise Murray, Andrew Christy, Alberto Arruda, Sanaz Talaifar, Theresa Smart, Maureen Bielinski, Samuel Baker, Jaime Hovey, Tal Brewer, Anne Jeffrey.

Today’s sessions are Jennifer Frey on Happiness and Candace Vogler on Happiness and Social Life; follow along with our live-tweeting from @UChiVirtue.

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Below is a sampling from yesterday’s sessions with Fr Stephen Brock on Aquinas and the Law and Dan McAdams on Generativity.

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Live-tweeting our Summer Seminar “Virtue, Happiness, and Self-Transcendence” – days 3 and 4

Our Summer Session participants have been discussing research and application in the areas of philosophy, psychology, and theology – we’re live-tweeting from @UChiVirtue #vhml17.

Talbot Brewer, Dan McAdams, Jennifer A. Frey, and Fr. Stephen Brock have been leading discussions.

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Interview with Craig Iffland, Summer Session Participant

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This post is part of a series of interviews with our incoming class for the “Virtue, Happiness, & Self-Transcendence” 2017 Summer Seminar. Craig Iffland is a John Templeton Fellow at the University of Notre Dame Center for Theology, Science, and Human Flourishing. Valerie Wallace is Associate Director, Communications, for Virtue, Happiness, & the Meaning of Life.

Valerie Wallace: Where are you from?

Craig Iffland: I’m from Centreville, Virginia, which is a small suburb about thirty minutes outside Washington D.C.

VW: Tell me about your research.

CI: I work in fundamental moral theology. My dissertation focuses on the intersection between law, sin, and obligation in Thomas Aquinas, paying particular attention to his conception of law as a measure and rule. My aim in so doing is to bring some conceptual clarity to debates over exceptionless moral rules, particularly among contemporary moral theologians. As those debates also turn on questions of intention and action, I have had an abiding interest in the thought of Elizabeth Anscombe. As a John Templeton Fellow at the University of Notre Dame Center for Theology, Science, and Human Flourishing, I’ve also had the opportunity to do quite a bit of interdisciplinary research on social cognition, particularly in the area of collective intentionality.

VW: What are you most looking forward to about this summer’s seminar?

CI: First, learning from an incredible roster of faculty for this year’s seminar. In particular, I’m excited to get some class time with Talbot Brewer since I never had a class with him during my undergraduate years at the University of Virginia. Second, conversations with my fellow students, particularly those working in psychology. I’ve found that engagement with those working in the sciences really help me to sharpen my own views about the underlying capacities that enable and help shape moral discourse.

VW: What are your non-academic interests?

CI: I’m really into movies. My favorite director is Quentin Tarantino. I run a little “film forum” once a month for students at Notre Dame, usually focusing on a common theme or genre (e.g., the “Western”). I like travelling, meeting new people, and making new friends. The place that has the felt the most “home away from home” is Johannesburg, South Africa, where I spent the past two summers doing research.

Interview with Marta Faria, Summer Session Participant

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This post is part of a series of interviews with our incoming class for the “Virtue, Happiness, & Self-Transcendence” 2017 Summer Seminar. Marta Faria is a PhD student in Philosophy at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross, Rome. Valerie Wallace is Associate Director, Communications, for Virtue, Happiness, & the Meaning of Life.

Valerie Wallace: Where are you from?

Marta Faria: I am originally from Portugal and I am studying in Rome even though I spend half of the year in Lisbon and half of the year in Rome.

VW: Tell me about your research.

MF: I am doing a Ph.D. in Thomistic Metaphysics. My topic is the Common Good of the Universe in Saint Thomas Aquinas. I am mostly interested in the metaphysical foundations of Ethics, Politics and Human Action in general. As a philosophical topic of inquiry, the common good has traditionally been a topic of disciplines like Ethics and Political Philosophy.  When one analyzes the common good from these intermediate perspectives, it calls for a relative definition: it is the good of a certain collective subject such as the family, the city, or the state. Additionally, we see that, in the doctrine of Saint Thomas Aquinas, these intermediate subjects are conceived as parts of a whole (eg: a particular family is a part of civil society) and can only be fully understood as such. This implies that the intelligible character of these intermediate conceptions of the common good needs to be derived from the good to which each is immediately ordered. For instance, the proper good of the individual is ordered to the common good of the family, which is ordered to the common good of the city, which is ordered to the common good of the state, which is ordered to the universal common good. This happens to be the case because the common good is a good and therefore an end. Consequently, the formal character of the common good must be derived from the ultimate end to which all intermediate partial common goods are finally ordered: the common good of the universe.
Along with being fundamental for the understanding of the intermediary common goods, the question of the universal common good is also interesting for another reason. Saint Thomas makes his own the Dionysian adagio “bonum diffusivum sui”, which implies that for the Angelic Doctor the “good qua good” is communicable. Therefore, the comprehension of the universal common good is also necessary to fully grasp the same nature of the good as intrinsically communicable. There is no other good whose communication is more pervasive than the universal common good, therefore, it must be the highest good of all, not just extensively, as that comes from its own definition, but also intensively. My research being mostly metaphysical aims to study the metaphysical foundations of the good, the key concept of any ethical project.

VW: What are you most looking forward to about this summer’s seminar?

MF:  Even though it is obvious that I expect to learn greatly from the talks of the main speakers I also find that the interaction and discussions with the other participants are extremely interesting. I will get to learn different perspectives over topics that I am used to frame in a specific manner and I will have the opportunity to confront my ideas with other people and to test how consistent they are.

VW: What are your non-academic interests?

MF: All sports in general but mainly jogging and volleyball.

The Structural Significance of Pagan Virtue

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We’re presenting a short series of abstracts of the work-in-progress our scholars presented and discussed at their June 2017 Working Group Meeting.

Angela Knobel is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the School of Philosophy at The Catholic University of America.

 

Augustine is supposed to have said that the virtues of the pagans were no more than ‘splendid vices’. Whether he actually made such a claim and what he meant by it is the subject of much debate.  But on one reasonable interpretation of that claim, Augustine believed that non-Christians could not possess any genuine virtues at all.  Several recent scholars have argued that this was not only Augustine’s view, but Aquinas’s as well.  Many of the scholars who make this claim do so in the context of emphasizing the importance of Aquinas’s (often overlooked) theory of infused moral virtue.  In this paper, I argue that Aquinas not only recognizes the possibility of genuine virtue in non-believers, but that that recognition plays a crucial structural role in his broader account of virtue.  We cannot truly appreciate his theory of infused virtue, that is  to say, unless we see it as building on and presupposing the possibility of pagan virtue.  I conclude by offering a hypothesis about a likely source of contemporary Thomist suspicion of pagan virtue.